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THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS ANNO-
TATED WITH KENTUCKY DECISIONS*
By FRANK MURRAY**
Section 33. AN TNDEFINIE OFFER MAY CREATE A CON-
TRACT UPON PERFORMANCE BY 0FFEREE.
An offer which is too indefinite to create a contract if,
verbally accepted, may, by entire or partial performance on
the part of the offeree, create a contract.
Annotatwn
This section states the law in Kentucky. Loutsville & N. R. Co.
v. Coyle, 123 Ky. 854, 97 S. W 772 (1906) (Stating that the indefinite-
ness of a verbal agreement may be cured by part performance), Curry
v. Kentucky Western By. Co., 25 K. L. R. 1372, 7 S. W 435 (1904)
(Holding that a promise to domiate a right of way to a railroad com-
pany which did not specify the company to receive it nor the land to
be conveyed is not open to objection of uncertainty when a company
has been formed end has taken possession of land with consent of the
donor). See also Schweitzer v. Schweitzer, 26 K. L. R., 888, 82 S. W
625 (1904) and Caskey v. Williams Bros., 227 Ky. 73, 11 S. W (2d) 991
(1928).
When naterial terms are left to the future agreement of the
parties the agreement is generally too indefinite, but this objection
can not be raised after the parties have agreed on the terms-Slade
v. City of Lexington, 141 iKy. 214, 132 S. W 404 (1910). See also
dictum in Kentutcky Portland Cement Co. v. Steckel, 164 Ky. 420, 175
S. W 663 (1915).
Part performance may remove the objection of uncertainty at
least as to the part -performed as where the time of employment is so
indefinite that no executory contract is formed yet the employee is
entitled to payment under the agreement until terminated-Loutsville
d N. R. Co. v. Offutt, 99 Ky 427, 31 S. W 181 (1896),; Elklhorn Con.
C. & C. v. Baton, Rhodes & Co., 163 Ky. 306, 173 S. W 798.
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A. L. I. RESTATEMENT OF LAW OF CONTRACTS
But even if there is part performance, if the substantial part of
the promise remains indefinite, the agreement is invalid-Killebrew v.
Murray, 151 Ky. 345, 151 G. W 662 (1912).
Section 34. OFimR UNTIL TERMINATED MAY BE ACCEPTED.
An offer until terninated gives to the offeree a contining
power to create a contract by acceptance of the offer.
Annotation
This is the doctrine -of "continuing offer" which is so well estab-
lished that it is seldom mentioned by the courts. In Walton's Exr. v.
Franks, 191 Ky. 32, 228 S. W 1025 (1921) it is said "if such offer is
allowed to remain open until accepted, it will become a binding con-
tract."
Section 35. How AN OF i' MAY BE TERMINATED, EEFECT
oF TERMINATION.
1. An offer may be terminated by
a. rejection by the offeree, or
b. lapse of time, or the happening of a condition
stated in the offer as causing termination, or
c. death or destruction of a person or thing essential
for the performance of the proposed contract, or
d. supervening legal prohibition of the proposed
contract;
or, except as stated in Sections 45, 46 and 47, by
e. revocation by the offeror, or
f. the offeror's death or such insanity as deprives
hun of legal capacity to enter into the proposed
contract.
2. Where an offer is terminated in one of these ways a
contract cannot be created by subsequent acceptance.
Annotation
Subsection (1) is introductory to the sections wInch follow and
states in general terms the various ways in wbich an offer may be
terminated. The statements are seemingly in accord with the Law
of Kentucky. Since much of the same matter is covered in detail in
later sections, there will be no attempt to cite cases in this note except
as to the parts not repeated.
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a. Rejection by the offeree terminates the offer-Davs v. Partsh's
Rep., 16 Ky. (Litt Sel Cas) 153, 12 Amer. Dec. 287 (1812), Henson
& Co. v. Wilson, 21 K. L. R. 1382, 55 S. W 209 (1900). See also Sec-
tions 36 and 37 (what amounts to a rejection), ,Section 39 (when
effective), Section 69 (when received), Section 38 (counteroffers as
rejections), and Sections 60-62 (qualified acceptances).
b. See Section 40 infra.
c. See Section 49 infra.
d. See Section 50 infra.
e. Unless the offer comes within the exceptions stated, it may be
revoked by the offeror at any time before acceptance-Walton's Exr v.
Franks, 191 Ky. 32, 228 S. W 1025 (1921), L. A. Becker Co. v. Alvey, 27
K. L. R. 832, 86 S. W 974 (1905). This is true although the offer is
made in writing-Burton v. kihotwell, 76 Ky. (13 Bush) 271 (1877) and
even if the offer is expressly made for a definite time-Litz v. Goosling,
14 K. L. R. 91, 19 S. W 527 (1892). See also Section 41 (necessity of
commuication of the revocation), Section 42 (knowledge by offeree
that subject-matter -as been sold), Section 43 (revocation of general
offers), Section 44 (revocation 'of an 'offer to enter into a series of
contracts), Section 45 (revocation of an offer for a unilateral contract)
and Section 27 (revocation of a bid at an auction sale).
f. See Section 48 infra.
Subsection (2) completes 'the statement made in Section 34 supra
and states the legal effect of the termination of an offer in any of the
ways mentioned in Subsection (1). In Walton's Ixr v. Franks, 191
Ky. 32, 228 S. W 1025, it is said that "either 'rejection or withdrawal
leaves the matter as if no offer had ever been made." In Shaw v.
Ingram-Day Lumber Co., 152 Ky. 329, 153 S. W 431 it is said "An offer
when once rejected loses its legal force and cannot be accepted there-
after so as to create a binding agreement without the assent of the
party making the original offer." Since most of the cases have arisen
because of attempted acceptance after the offer was terminated, this
statement finds support in practically all of the decisions cited above
and in the following sections.
Section 36. WHAT IS A REJECTIOINT OF AN 0yFEI.
An offer is rejected when the offeror is justified in infer-
ring from the words or conduct of the offeree that the offeree
intends not to accept the offer or to give it further considera-
tion.
Annotation
This is a general definition of a rejection as it is applied to
particular situations by later sections. See Section 37 as to outright
rejections; Section 60 as to qualified acceptances; and Section 62 as to
an acceptance coupled with a request.
A.. L. I. RESTATEMF-NT OF LAW OF CONTRACTS
Section 37. COM,uN.xicATION BY OFFEREE DECLIING THE
OFFER IS A REJECTION.
A communumcation from the offeree to the offeror, stating in
effect that the offeree declines to accept the offer is a rejection.
Annotation
This section deals with avowed rejections. The rejection may be
outright as in New Yorkc Lsfe Ins. Co. v. Levy's Adm., 122 Ky. 457, 92
S. W 325 (1906) or it may be gathered from the meaning of language
that is less emphatic-Shaw v. IngrainDay LuMber Co., 152 Ky. 329,
153 S. W 431 (1913) (A reply that the performance of -the contract is
impossible is a rejection of the offer), Henson & Co. v. Wilson, ?1
K. L. R. 1382, 55 S. W 209 (1900) (A reply that a warrant will not be
accepted at a premium is a rejection of a tender of the warrant as
payment in full of a sum greater than the .face of the warrant).
Section 38. COUNTER-OFFER BY OFFEREE IS A REJECTION.
A counter-offer by the offeree, relating to the same matter
as the original offer, is a rejection of the original offer, unless
the offeree at the same time states in express terms that he is
still keeping the original offer under advisement.
Comment
a. A counter-offer amounts in legal effect to a statement
by the offeree not only that he is willing to do something dif-
ferent m regard to the matter proposed, but also that he will
not agree to the proposal of the offeror. A counter-offer must
fulfill the requirements of an origial offer. There is none
unless there is a manifestation sufficient to create a power of
acceptance m the original offeror. This distinguishes a
counter-offer from a mere inquiry regarding the possibility of
different terms, a request for a better offer, or a comment upon
the terms of the offer. Likewise, an offer dealing with an
entirely.new matter and not proposed as a substitution for the
original offer is not a counter-offer.
Annotation
This statement is in accord with the law of this state. Our courts
have said "A proposal to accept or an acceptance upon terms varying
from those offered is a rejection of the offer, and ends the negotiation,
unless the offer is renewed, or the proposed modification accepted"-
Shaw v. Ingrain-Day Lbr Co., 152 Ky. 329, 335, 153 S. W 431 (1913).
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See also Hitcheson v. BMakeman, 60 Ky. (3 Mete) 80 (1860) and Gold
kiprmng Dist. Co. v. Stitzel Dist. Co., 150 Ky. 457, 150 S. W 516 (1912).
But a counter-offer does not have this effect if the offer is irrevoca-
ble as in case of an option contract-askey v. Wifliams Bros., 227
Ky. 73, 11 S. W (2d) 991 (1928).
Section 39. TIME WHEN REJECTioN is EFFECTIVE.
Rejection by mail or telegram does not destroy the power
of acceptance until received by the offeror, but limits the power
so that a letter or telegram of acceptance started after the
sending of the rejection is only a counter-offer unless the ac-
ceptance is received by the offeror before he receives the rejec-
tion.
Annotation
No Kentucky cases.
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